This weekend I attended a track day at Blyton Park Race Track and got to drive a formula Renault race car. As you can probably imagine the acceleration and speed were incredible. Now the adrenalin has settled down this experience made me think about the impact of speed in road traffic accident claims and what this means in terms of negligence.
In the case of Quinn v Scott [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1004, Glyn-Jones J dealt with this very point.
The claimant was driving a minibus along a main road bordered on his offside by land owned by the second defendants when part of a beech tree fell from that land across the road in front of the minibus. The claimant stopped short of the tree in his nearside lane when a Jaguar car driven in the opposite direction by the first defendant came through the foliage of the tree and collided with the plaintiff, causing him personal injuries. It was a wide road with three traffic lanes and the first defendant was driving at a speed of 70 to 75 m.p.h. in the centre lane when he saw the tree falling at a distance of about 50 yards.
The claimant claimed damages as against the first defendant alleging he was driving too fast and failed to stop or control his car.
Glyn- Jones J held “The high speed alone is not evidence of negligence unless the particular conditions at the time preclude it” [1007].
In the more recent case of Matthew Peter Lamoon v John Clifford Fry [2004] EWCA Civ 591, the defendant (Mr Fry) was driving at 40mph in a 60mph, upon taking a bend in the road, he maintained this speed, the claimant coming in the opposite direction on a bicycle cut the corner, a collision occurred. At first instance, the claimant was held 60% responsible for the accident but the defendant was also partially to blame owing to his speed.
On appeal, the court found [15]:
“I am similarly satisfied that it is impossible to say that the judge was wrong to conclude that the excessive speed was a cause of the collision. I accept Mr Melville-Shreeve’s submission that, albeit, as the judge found, the motorist was properly keeping to his side of the road while taking this bend, nevertheless on such a road he had to be aware of the possibility of other users of the road who may be at risk if he drove too fast for those conditions. At a slower speed, alive to that danger, he could well have avoided a collision, even if he could not have stopped within the distance. It was for the judge to assess that matter: he assessed it as probable, and I cannot say he was wrong to do so”
What is clear from the above authorities is that speed must be considered in the context of the circumstances. A driver may be driving below the speed limit but still be driving too fast for the road conditions and thus negligent.
But what is the position if there is no speed?
In the case of Gary Houghton v Melvyn Stannard [2004] EWCA Civ 107, the claimant suffered serious injuries when the defendant collided with his stationary vehicle whilst he was sat inside. The issue at trial was whether the claimant had contributed to the negligence. At first instance, the court found the claimant was not contributory negligent. On appeal, the defendant argued the judge at first instance applied the wrong test and or failed to find contributory negligence in three respects being: (1) the claimant failing to leave the dual carriageway knowing his car was breaking down, (2) failing to stop his car as far as possible to the left hand side of the carriageway, and (3) getting back into and remaining in the car.
Various cases were referred to that espouse the relevant principals (see [6] of the judgment for citations):
‘the question … was whether, in the position in which it was parked it was a possible source of danger to other road users using the road in a way in which he, Mr Rogers, could reasonably expect them to use it’
‘If a driver so negligently manages his vehicle so as to cause it to obstruct the highway and to constitute a danger to other road users, including those who are driving too fast or not keeping a proper lookout but not those who deliberately or recklessly drive into the obstruction, then the first driver’s negligence may be held to have contributed to the causation of an act, of which the immediate cause was the negligent driving of a vehicle, which, because of the presence of the obstruction, collides with it or with some other vehicle or some other person’
In the instant case, the appeal court upheld the lower court’s decision, there being no arguable error of principle in the judges approach to the case [10] but the case helpfully summarises the principals to consider that could result in a person being contributory negligent whilst in a stationary vehicle.
